
SEG_SEQ = CLT_SEQ_0, SEG_FLAG = SYN Its state is
now SYN-SENT - On receipt of this packet the server
acknowledges the client sequence number, sends its
= SYN and set SVR_ACK=CLT_SEQ_0+1 Its state is now
SYN-RECEIVED - On receipt of this packet the client
acknowledges the server sequence number: SEG_SEQ =
CLT_SEQ_0+1, SEQ_ACK = SVR_SEQ_0+1 and sets
CLT_ACK=SVR_SEQ_0+1 Its state is now ESTABLISHED - On
state. We now have: CLT_SEQ = CLT_SEQ_0+1 CLT_ACK
= SVR_SEQ_0+1 SVR_SEQ = SVR_SEQ_0+1 SVR_ACK =
CLT_SEQ_0+1 Server Client LISTEN CLOSED .- SYN, CLT_SEQ_0
A-.B: SYN, ISSx B's response to X's original SYN (so
to speak) B-.A: SYN, ISSb', ACK(ISSx) A-.B: ACK(ISSb')
using the predicted value for ISSb'. If the guess is
right -- and
Although easy to detect when used on a local network, the
attack presented here is quite efficient on long distance,
low bandwidth, high delay networks (usually WAN). It can
be carried with the same resources as for a passive sniffing
. This attack has also the dangerous advantage of being
Internet is becoming more and more frequent, the stealthfulness
of the attack is now a very important parameter for the
success of the attack and makes it more difficult to
detect. When everybody's attention in the Internet is
current IPv4, increasing attacks and the need for secure
systems press us to develop and use a secure transport
layer for the Internet community. Options should be
available to send signed and eventually encrypted data
to provide privacy. And since the signature of the data
implies reliability the signature can be substitute
More precisely, RFC 793 specifies that the 32-bit counter
be incremented by 1 in the low-order position about every
it by 128 every second, and 64 for each new connection.
Thus, if you open a connection to a machine, you know to
a very high degree of confidence what sequence number it
will use for its next connection. And therein lies the
`Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite'', Computer
Communications Review 19:2, April 1989, pp. 32-48 (URLs
below). Both his attack and my generalizations are special
cases of a more general attack, IP source address spoofing,
machine's IP address in conjunction with some protocol
(such as rsh) that does address-based authentication.
Me at Defcon IV.